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#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1982

SECRET/NOFORN
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

National Intelligence Topics (NITs)

Thank you for your memorandum on the NITs and particularly for the excellent summary of intelligence community responses to last year's NITs of current interest. This is a very helpful forum providing as it does a compilation of short answers to these questions, as well as a measure of those gaps in our collection and understanding which remain. I agree that this process is an important one for involving policymakers directly in identifying intelligence priorities.

It appears that virtually all of last year's NITs remain valid and ongoing, particularly in areas where our knowledge is incomplete. I have identified in the attachment at Tab A new topics which I believe are of particular interest for the coming year. As was the case last year, these are in the form of questions prepared by my staff. These questions are quite specific, but they seek to refine and illuminate issues to better enable the intelligence community to focus its efforts.

It appears that while last year's NITs were specific enough to allow the compilation of very helpful responses, the NITs of continuing interest remain very broad. It perhaps would be helpful to the intelligence community if these topics were more detailed and specific in a manner similar to those of current interest. This would also allow preparation of a similarly useful summary of responses. At Tab B I have suggested the addition of several NITs of continuing interest, as well as changes in several priorities.

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Finally, I would hope that we could ensure that the gaps in collection and understanding identified in the responses are included in the program and budget processes so that our identified intelligence needs can lead to increases in our capabilities.

I hope my response has been helpful and look forward to working with you in this important task.

William P. Clark

#### Attachments

Tab A New National Intelligence Topics

Tab B Recommended Changes to NITs of Continuing Interest

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